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I. INTRODUCTION

'Even at our best, we are only out for ourselves."1
It is human nature to act in one's own interest. Though
ethicists and psychologists may disagree about the extent to which
self-interest is a motivating factor behind human behavior, most
accept that it plays some role. 2 Assuming that human behavior is at
least in part a function of self-interest, laws should be expected to
reflect that behavior. Many already do: the law of agency imposes a
duty on the agent to act with obedience towards his principal, 3 and the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from
representing a client when the lawyer's personal interests interfere
with the representation. 4 Where money is involved, the need to curb
the incentive to advance one's own interests at the expense of another
is even greater; for example, the law prohibits a corporate director
from enriching himself at the expense of the corporation.
Specifically, the law of fiduciary duty addresses the problems
associated with having one group of people manage the money of a
second group. In the corporate context, the law of fiduciary duty is a
(usually) well-defined concept with a substantial amount of case law.
This predictability is a desirable characteristic, as it enables directors
to make confident business decisions without fear that they have
breached their duties to the corporation and its shareholders. Given
1.

Claire Andre & Manuel Velasqeuz, Unmasking the Motives of the Good Samaritan, 2

ISSUES IN ETHICS (1989), http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v2nl/samaritan.html.

2.
See Michael Anthony Slote, An Empirical Basis for Psychological Egoism, 61 J. PHIL.
530, 530-37 (1964). See generally C.D. Broad, Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives, in BROAD'S
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY (David R. Cheney ed., 1971).
3.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385 (1958).

4.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
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the size and breadth of today's largest corporations, liability for breach
of a fiduciary duty can be staggering. Accordingly, states have strived
5
to clarify their corporate jurisprudence.
While the law of fiduciary duty is clear when applied to
healthy, solvent corporations, its application becomes muddled when
applied to financially distressed firms. In part, this is because a
financially distressed firm is a different beast than a solvent firm. The
''corporate enterprise" of an insolvent firm comprises the same
constituencies 6 as a solvent firm, but the interests and risk levels of
the respective constituencies are changed. Whereas these interests are
usually harmonious in a solvent corporation, each self-interested
constituency might find itself in tension with the others when
insolvency is looming.
Consequently, as a corporation nears insolvency and finally
becomes insolvent, the common law's emphasis on shareholder
interests makes less and less sense. Upon insolvency, shareholders
have nothing more to lose, as little equity remains in the company. At
the same time, however, they still have everything to gain; although
their shares are presently worthless, they retain the potential to be
worth something, if the corporation can reverse its financial distress.
A rationally self-interested shareholder would favor high risk ventures
to maximize firm value, since he cannot lose any more money. The
shareholder becomes a high stakes gambler, using other people's
money-the creditors-as ante. Given the limited downside, why not
gamble with the corporation's remaining assets and try to rebuild
some of its value?
From the creditor's point of view, however, this is an
undesirable course of action because shareholder risk-taking will more
likely than not diminish the value of the remaining corporate assets
from which the creditors must get paid. If the firm is truly insolvent,
then the creditors will satisfy their claims with money derived from
the liquidation of corporate assets, with each creditor taking his share
of the corporate pie. Any dissipation of these assets caused by
precarious ventures taken on behalf of the shareholders will mean less
money for the creditors. From the creditor's standpoint, insolvency
causes the shareholder to lose his status as a residual claimant, since
it is now the creditors who bear any risk of loss.
5.
For example, it is said that one reason why so many corporations are chartered in
Delaware is because of the expertise of the courts and the substantial body of case law, which
provides a measure of predictability.
6.
Corporate constituencies include groups that make up the entire corporate enterprise,
for example, shareholders, creditors, employees, suppliers and customers. The term can include
local communities, governments, and even NGOs.
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Although law as applied to near-insolventfirms is unclear, it is
7
at least clear that upon insolvency in fact, a duty is owed to creditors.
This duty arises from the "trust fund doctrine," which holds that the
directors of an insolvent corporation become the trustees of the
remaining corporate assets, of which the creditors are the
beneficiaries. The directors thus owe the firm's creditors a fiduciary
duty as any trustee would owe the duty to a trust beneficiary. A
competing theory, known as the "at-risk doctrine," holds that an
obligation is owed to creditors because creditors of an insolvent firm
bear most of the downside risk and may be subjected to shareholder
opportunism. 8 In any case, it is now settled that a fiduciary duty is
owed to the creditors of a firm that is insolvent in fact.
It is still unsettled, however, whether this duty extends to
creditors when a corporation is in a state of near-insolvency. State
courts and federal bankruptcy courts have recently considered the
issue of fiduciary duties in near-insolvent firms. At one end of the
spectrum, courts allow for the possibility of an affirmative duty to
creditors.9 At the other extreme, courts hold that no real "duty" is
owed to creditors of near-insolvent firms. 10
This Note rejects the idea that creditors are the beneficiaries of
fiduciary duties in near-insolvency. Any consideration of creditor
interests in a near-insolvent firm should be derivative of the general
duty to the corporate enterprise. A director's obligations are thus
permissive in nature: directors of near-insolvent firms need not
consider creditor interests, although they may choose to do so.
Directors may also decide how much weight to allocate to those

7.
Throughout this Note, I use the phrase "insolvent in fact" to refer to a firm that is
clearly and objectively insolvent. The phrase "near-insolvent" refers to a firm that is not yet
objectively insolvent, but not quite solvent either. The distinction is important because law that
applies to firms that are "insolvent in fact" does not necessarily apply to firms that are "nearinsolvent." The term "near-insolvency" encompasses what other courts and commentators
sometimes characterize as "the vicinity of insolvency," "the zone of insolvency," "doubtful
solvency," and "risk of insolvency." See infra note 76.
8.
Pamela L.J. Huff & Russell C. Silberglied, From Production Resources to Peoples
Department Stores: A Similar Response by Delaware and Canadian Courts on the Fiduciary
Duties of Directors to Creditorsof Insolvent Companies, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2007)
(manuscript at *10), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/conferences/Twilight/
SILBERGLEID%20&%20HUFF.PDF.
9.
See, e.g., FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that
directors of an insolvent corporation owe direct fiduciary duty to creditors in their capacity as
trustees of corporate assets).
10. See, e.g., Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772, 788-89 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(suggesting that there is no affirmative duty in near-insolvency, but rather that directors may
benefit from an additional "shield" to protect them from shareholder lawsuits).
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interests. Ultimately, their duty is really owed to the corporation
itself.
This "discretionary" approach embraces the sometimesobscured principle that directors owe their duty to the entire corporate
enterprise, not just to shareholders.1 1 It conceptualizes the entire
corporation as a bundle of self-interested constituencies, each with
interests and risk levels that are sensitive to the corporation's
financial health. This approach recognizes that, when a firm is nearinsolvent, directors are entitled to consider strategies that are less
risky than a shareholder seeking to maximize share value would
consider optimal. In this sense, the discretionary approach is
consistent with current corporate common law, by allowing (but not
compelling) directors to consider the interests of other stakeholders
12
when those interests can be tied to aggregate firm value.
The discretionary approach avoids some of the larger problems
afflicting trust fund based theories. First, the trust fund doctrine
cannot legitimately be extended beyond insolvency in fact. In a nearinsolvent firm, however, the directors' role as trustees has not yet
been triggered, so an extension of an affirmative fiduciary duty based
on their status as trustees makes little sense. Conversely, the
discretionary approach can be conceptually applied beyond insolvency
in fact.
Second, unlike many current formulations based on the trust
fund doctrine, the discretionary approach does not have a triggering
point; no time, expense, or effort need be wasted in determining when
it is activated. A trust-fund duty that is triggered only upon insolvency
(or near-insolvency) requires directors to gauge their corporation's
financial health. However, it is difficult to determine exactly when a
firm becomes insolvent or near-insolvent. The discretionary approach
avoids this entire issue. It does not recognize a duty that runs
affirmatively from directors to creditors that is triggered upon the
occurrence of a certain event. Rather, the duty is first and foremost a

11.

See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and

Stockholders in Change of Control Transactions:Is There any "There" There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.

1169, 1176-77 (2002) (explaining that outside of Revlon situations, directors may consider
stakeholder interests if those interests are tied to the long-term value of the corporate
enterprise).
12. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1989)
(holding that a board of a target company may consider the impact of the bid on other
constituencies, "provided that it bears some reasonable relationship to general shareholder
interests"); see also Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) (holding
that unless Revlon duties are implicated, directors are not under a duty to maximize shareholder
value in the short term and may thus favor a merger offering shareholders a lower premium,
but, in the good faith belief of the directors, a better long-term value).
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constant duty to the corporation from which creditors, as a class, may
benefit derivatively. The corporation remains the object of the injury
as well as the recipient of any damages award. Only where a creditor
is so singled out that his injuries are clearly separable from any harm
to the corporate entity should a direct claim be allowed.
Third, and most importantly, the discretionary approach brings
predictability to an area of law that has been plagued by ambiguity.
Directors trying to comply with their corporate common law duty to
shareholders might feel compelled to undertake risky ventures to
restore equity to a near-insolvent corporation. The failure of these
ventures has, in some situations, exposed the directors to creditor
lawsuits. 13 Conversely, directors who consider the interests of
creditors in an attempt to avoid liability have been sued anyway, this
time by their own shareholders. 14 Without the benefit of predictable
law, corporate directors are placed in the untenable position of facing
potential liability no matter what they do. The discretionary approach
brings stability to the directors of a near-insolvent firm by extending a
familiar duty that is consistent with corporate common law: it allows
them, but does not compel them, to incorporate creditor interests into
their business judgment. Ultimately, because board decisions made in
a near-insolvent corporation should be scrutinized the same way as
decisions made in a solvent corporation, the entire "near-insolvent"
distinction should be done away with.
Part II of this Note provides a general overview of corporate
fiduciary duties and how they have been interpreted to apply to
solvent and insolvent corporations. Part III examines the "expansion"
of insolvency duties to include near-insolvent corporations and surveys
the most recent court decisions. Part IV proposes that a discretionary
approach is the solution that is most consistent with contemporary
corporate law. Just like in a solvent corporation, directors of a nearinsolvent corporation should be entitled to balance the interests of the
corporate constituencies in a way that is reasonably related to
shareholder interests. Since the analysis is the same in both solvency
and near-insolvency, there is no reason to continue distinguishing
between the two.

13. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance
Capital Group, Inc. (In re Buckhead America Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 960 n.4 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994).
14. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comm. Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *20 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). (considering an action by a 98% shareholder versus
board of directors for pursuing less risky course of action arguably in favor of creditor interests
and opposed to the shareholder's interests).

20071

THE DUTY OF CREDITORS

1241

II. CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES

Fiduciary duties are context-specific, for they shift to new
beneficiaries as the financial status of the corporation changes. In a
solvent firm, fiduciary duties run to the benefit of the corporation and
its shareholders. When a firm is insolvent in fact, the duty extends to
creditors. To complicate matters, however, a few courts now
distinguish near-insolvent corporations, which lie somewhere in the
ambiguous realm between solvency and insolvency.15 Thus, any
analysis of fiduciary duties in near-insolvent corporations must first
begin with an examination of fiduciary duties owed in clearly solvent
and clearly insolvent corporations.

A. Directors'Dutiesin a Solvent Corporation
In a solvent corporation, directors generally owe fiduciary
duties to the corporation and its shareholders. 16 Shareholders are in
need of fiduciary protection because of the open-ended nature of their
relationship with the corporation and its directors. A shareholder is an
"owner" of the corporation, but in most cases he cannot exercise any
control over its ordinary business operations. 17 Thus, a shareholder
must rely on a second class of people, directors, to manage the
corporation.18 The law behind this concept evolved as a response to the
basic problems involved with one person managing another person's
money. As Adam Smith put it,
the directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with
Negligence and profusion, therefore,
the same anxious vigilance [as a true owner] ....
must always prevail, more of less, in the management of the affairs of such a
19
company.

Thus, by holding directors accountable to the corporation and
its shareholders for their acts of disloyalty or imprudence, the law of

15. See id. at *108 n.55 (noting, in dictum, that when a corporation enters 'the vicinity of
insolvency,' directors may consider creditor interests).
16. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
17. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2007) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors .... ). There are some exceptions to the strict separation of functions between
shareholders and directors, such as in certain forms of closely held corporations.
18. Directors often manage a corporation through the acts of their agents, the corporate
officers.
19.

ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (Modern Library 1937) (1776).
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fiduciary duty minimizes the "negligence and profusion" found
wherever one person acts in the interests of another.
In becoming an owner of shares, the shareholder takes on the
dual roles of risk-taker and residual claimant. However, although the
shareholder bears the risk, it is the director and officer who, through
their decisions, can directly affect the value of the firm. Thus directors
must act as "custodians entrusted with the management of the
shareholders' assets." 20 Since a shareholder does not set forth his
rights in a written contract, fiduciary duties "fill the gap," acting as an
alternative to the express delineation of rights among the shareholder,
the corporation, and its directors.
Fiduciary duties in solvent corporations take two general
forms. First, directors owe a duty of loyalty to put the corporation's
interests ahead of their own. 2 1 The duty of loyalty is implicated,
22
among other things, when a director usurps a corporate opportunity,
engages in self dealing, 23 or assigns himself excessive compensation at
the corporation's expense. 24 Second, directors must abide by a general
duty of care to exercise the reasonable diligence that a person in a like
position would exercise. 25 Directors are protected from judicial secondguessing of their business decisions by the procedural and substantive
advantages of the "business judgment rule," a presumption that
directors will act in a reasonably informed manner when making a
business decision; however, courts have sometimes denied directors
the benefits of the business judgment rule when a plaintiff rebuts it
26
upon a showing gross negligence.
Conversely, the only duties owed to creditors in a solvent
corporation are contractual in nature. There is no recognized fiduciary

20.

Brent

Nicholson,

Recent Delaware Case Law Regarding Director's Duties to

Bondholders, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 573, 575 (1994).

21.

Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361-62 (Del. 1993); MODEL Bus. CORP.

ACT § 8.30(a) (1984).

22. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. 1939) (holding that if a director takes an
opportunity that is (1) in the line of the corporation's business; (2) in which the corporation has a
reasonable expectancy; and (3) the director's interest conflicts with the corporation's interest,
then he may not seize the opportunity).
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2007) (setting forth the requirements that must be met in
order to cleanse an interested transaction).
24. See, e.g., Byrne v. Lord, Nos. 14040, 14215, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, at *11 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 9, 1995) (holding that a stock option compensation plan must involve an identifiable benefit
to the corporation and must bear a reasonable relationship to the value of the services the
corporation receives).
25. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (1984).
26. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
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duty that runs directly to creditors of a solvent corporation. 27 The
general rationale is that creditors, unlike shareholders, can (and will)
expressly negotiate their rights in a written contract. Moreover, where
the corporation is solvent, creditors will at least hypothetically get
paid, and thus will have no reason to be unhappy.
B. Directors'Dutiesin an Insolvent Corporation
A corporation undergoes a fundamental change when it
becomes insolvent. In a solvent, profitable corporation, all
constituencies are theoretically content. Management aims to
maximize firm value, shareholders have equity in the profitable
enterprise, and creditors are paid as the corporation's debts come due.
But when the firm slides into insolvency, the general contentment
dissipates. Shareholders will favor undertaking riskier ventures to
boost share value, creditors will want the corporation to avoid risky
endeavors, and management is caught in the middle.
Upon insolvency, courts apply the rationale of the "trust fund
doctrine," which holds that directors of an insolvent corporation "no
longer owe a duty to stockholders who no longer have any viable
economic interest in the entity."28 Instead, the corporation's assets are
preserved to pay off creditor claims. Directors' duties thus shift from
"long term value maximization to preservation of existing asset value
29
for eventual distribution to creditors."
1. Determining Insolvency-The Balance Sheet and Equitable
Insolvency Tests
Since the trust-fund approach triggers only upon insolvency-infact, boards must face the ambiguous task of determining exactly
when a firm becomes insolvent. The two prevalent tests for
determining insolvency are the "balance sheet test" and the "equitable
insolvency test." According to the balance sheet test, a firm is
insolvent if its liabilities exceed its assets. 30 Under the equitable

27. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992) (citing Harff v.
Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 222 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev'd in part on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del.
1975)).
28. Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the
FinanciallyTroubled Company, 48 BuS. LAW. 239, 244 (1992).
29. Id.
30. Ramesh K.S. Rao, David Simon Sokolow & Derek White, FiduciaryDuty a la Lyonnais:
An Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance in a FinanciallyDistressed Firm, 22 IOWA J.

CORP. L. 53, 63 (1996) (the author uses the term "bankruptcy test" rather than "balance sheet
test," although they both refer to the same test).
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insolvency test, a firm is insolvent if it cannot pay its debts as they
come due in the ordinary course of business. 31 Given the malleability
of accounting figures, reasonable people may disagree on when a firm
is insolvent in fact, especially under the balance sheet test, which
relies on a comparison of accounting figures. The difficulty of
determining exactly when solvency ends and insolvency begins is
troubling, since insolvency is the triggering point of the trust-fund
duty to creditors. As a consequence, directors must operate without
clearly knowing when their duties will shift, if they have not shifted
already.
2. The Diverging Nature of Shareholder and Creditor Interests upon
Insolvency
Unsurprisingly, tensions arise between the shareholders and
creditors of an insolvent firm. Consider a firm that is insolvent under
both the balance sheet and equitable insolvency tests. In such a case
of clear insolvency, liabilities exceed assets. By definition, there is no
equity left in the firm to be distributed to shareholders. Further, since
the firm has been operating at a loss, it cannot distribute dividends
out of its income stream. The firm's insolvency essentially turns its
assets into a "trust fund for the payment of all the debts of the
corporation." 32 Given that the firm's liabilities exceed its assets,
however, some creditors must accept less than they are fully owed. At
the same time, shareholders are incented to undertake risky
endeavors to restore share value. In other words, the two
constituencies will disagree about the proper degree of risk that the
33
board should incorporate into its attempts to maximize firm value. If
courts do not recognize some sort of change in directors' duties, then a
board of an insolvent corporation will be induced to comply with its
duties to the shareholders and embark on excessively risky courses of
action, to the detriment of creditors.
3. The Trust Fund Doctrine
Recognizing the divergences between the interests of
shareholders and creditors, courts have granted additional protections
to creditors of insolvent corporations. The "trust fund doctrine"

31. Id.
32. Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944).
33. See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Director's Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1494-96 (1993) (noting the differences
between shareholder and bondholder incentives in a near-insolvent corporation).
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provides the basis for these protections. The doctrine holds that when
a corporation becomes insolvent, its assets are held in trust for
distribution to creditors; thus, directors, as trustees, owe a fiduciary
34
duty to creditors to protect the firm's remaining assets.
The trust fund doctrine was first introduced by the United
States Supreme Court in Wood v. Drummer.35 It originated from
modest roots, standing solely for the proposition that creditors, who
are preferred over shareholders in the distribution of assets, may sue
to recover assets wrongfully distributed. In Wood, an insolvent bank
issued a liquidating dividend to its shareholders, to the detriment of
its creditors. 36 The creditors sued to recover the capital distributed to
the shareholders. The Court held in favor of the creditors, finding that
while there was no evidence of fraud in issuing the dividend, the
"capital stock of banks is to be deemed a pledge or trust fund for the
37
payments of the debts contracted by the bank."
Over time, state courts pushed the trust fund doctrine beyond
its original scope. The Delaware courts first confronted the doctrine in
Asmussen v. Quaker City Corporation.38 There, the chancery court
initially rejected the doctrine, holding that, in the absence of bad faith,
a debtor was not liable for preferring some creditors over others. 39 The
Delaware Supreme Court adopted the doctrine a decade later in Bovay
v. H.M. Byllesby & Co. 40 The court held that:
an insolvent corporation is civilly dead in the sense that its property may be
administered as a trust fund for the benefit of creditors. The fact which creates the trust
is the insolvency, and when that fact is established, the trust arises, and the legality of
the acts thereafter performed will be decided by very different principles than in the
case of solvency.41

Despite Delaware's initial hesitancy to adopt and expand the
trust fund doctrine, a recent case has solidified the doctrine's place in
Delaware corporate law. In Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 42 the
court had to decide exactly when a firm becomes insolvent, thus
triggering trust fund duties. Thomas Geyer, a creditor of Ingersoll
Publications Co. ("IPCO"), sued to collect upon a two million dollar
note, claiming that IPCO entered into transactions that caused its
34. Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon (In re Zale Corp.), 196 B.R. 348, 354-55 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1996).
35. Wood, 30 F. Cas. at 435.
36. Id. at 436.
37. Id.
38. Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp., 156 A. 180 (Del. Ch. 1931).
39. Id. at 181.
40. Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808 (Del. 1944).
41. Id. at 813 (citations omitted).
42. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).
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own insolvency and thus its inability to pay back the debt it owed
Geyer. 43 Geyer argued that IPCO was insolvent in fact, which
triggered its trust fund duties. IPCO moved for dismissal, arguing
that insolvency duties are only triggered upon the filing of a
44
bankruptcy petition.
The bulk of the court's decision focused on determining when
the duty to creditors is activated. It noted as a preliminary matter
that "neither party seriously disputes that when the insolvency
exception does arise, it creates fiduciary duties for the directors for the
benefit of creditors." 45 The real question was whether these duties
were triggered upon insolvency in fact, or rather upon the
commencement of a formal bankruptcy proceeding. The court held
that insolvency in fact triggered these duties, regardless of whether
46
the debtor had filed for bankruptcy.
Thus, although directors owe their duties to the corporation
and its shareholders, a new beneficiary is created when a firm
becomes insolvent. Upon insolvency in fact, it is now generally
accepted that directors owe a duty to creditors. Exactly how far
beyond insolvency in fact this duty reaches is still unclear.

III. THE PROBLEM: DIRECTORS' DUTIES IN NEAR-INSOLVENT FIRMS
Recently, the duty to creditors expanded once more, this time
beyond insolvency in fact. In a single footnote, Chancellor Allen of the
Delaware Court of Chancery revived the debate on insolvency duties
and their proper scope.
A. The Credit Lyonnais Opinion and the "Vicinity of Insolvency"
The debate shifted to near-insolvency after the Delaware Court
of Chancery found a board of directors not liable for acting in the
interests of creditors in a firm that was in the "vicinity of
insolvency." 47 The controversy in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v.
Pathe Communications Corp.48 arose from an attempted leveraged

43. Id. at 786-87.
44. Id. at 787.
45. Id. (emphasis in original).
46. Id. at 790 ("[F]iduciary duties to creditors arise when one is able to establish the fact of
insolvency.").
47. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comm. Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
48. Id.
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buyout 49 ("LBO") of MGM/UA Communication Company ("MGM"). The
sponsor of the LBO, Pathe Communications Corp. ("Pathe"), was
controlled by a dominant shareholder, Giancarlo Paretti ("Paretti").
After executing the LBO, Pathe-and by implication, Paretti-owned
98.5% of MGM. 50 Paretti promptly elected himself as chairman of
51
MGM's board and appointed himself as chief executive officer.
However, Paretti soon ran into financial trouble. The financing
52
of the LBO, which Chancellor Allen described as "Byzantine,"
required Pathe to take out large loans from Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland ("the Bank"). Additionally, MGM had to license away its
film rights, in order to raise money to finance its own acquisition. 53 As
a result, it was left short of cash and cash-producing assets. 54 Further,
in an attempt to keep costs down, Paretti laid off personnel, including
many in the finance department. 55 The situation grew worse as the
remaining personnel struggled to cope with the increased workload.
Many "key people" resigned, leaving MGM with deficient internal
controls. 56 To make matters even worse, Paretti had raised $130
million of financing by licensing out MGM movie rights in a "put
agreement" that, if activated by the licensee, would force MGM to
refund $100 million immediately. 57 Paretti kept the nature of the put
agreement hidden from the Bank. Finally, in early 1990, due to lack of
cash flow, trade creditors forced MGM into an involuntary bankruptcy
5
proceeding.
Paretti worked with the Bank to salvage MGM. The Bank
agreed to extend additional credit on the condition that Paretti step
down from his position as chief executive officer and agree to the
Bank's designation of a new CEO experienced in the entertainment
49. A leveraged buyout is a mechanism by which a "management or finance entrepreneur
acquires control of a company through borrowed funds." Id. at *2. The entrepreneur raises money
by having the target company issue debt instruments to finance its own acquisition. Ideally, the
entrepreneur would take over the company, sell off non-core assets and turn the core business
into a more efficient enterprise. The debt should be paid off over time from the target's own
revenue stream. When unsuccessful, LBOs can lead to insolvency of the company, since the
company's debts are often a crushing burden.
50. Id. at *6.
51. Id.
52. Id. at *4. Chancellor Allen likely meant that the financing scheme was intricate and
complicated, although it is conceivable that he used the word "Byzantine" to refer to the deal as
scheming or devious. Id.
53. Id. at *6.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at *14.
58. Id. at *2.
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business. 59 A new five-person board of directors was created, composed
of the new CEO, a chief operating officer chosen by the CEO, and
three directors chosen by Paretti. The Bank also forced Paretti to
enter into a "Corporate Governance Agreement," whereby the Bank
would receive voting control of MGM should Paretti and Pathe default
60
on their loans.
The new governance structure ran into immediate problems
because Paretti attempted to hinder its operation by interfering with
the new CEO's authority. According to Chancellor Allen, "Paretti
barely masked his efforts to continue to dominate and control the
management of MGM." 6 1 Despite warnings from the Bank, Paretti
persisted in his efforts to control MGM, such as calling a board
meeting without a quorum and resolving that "Giancarlo Paretti be,
and he hereby is, authorized to sign all agreements in order to put into
proper form the [company's] existing commitments." 62 In response to
Paretti's constant attempts to violate the Corporate Governance
Agreement, the Bank exercised its right for voting control of Pathe's
63
stock.
Pathe sued after the Bank refused to vote in favor of selling
MGM's interest in a foreign movie distribution company. The sale
would have raised cash, arguably enough so that Paretti and Pathe
could take a large step in the direction of regaining control of MGM.
Pathe argued that the Bank, which now controlled MGM, was
obligated to act in the best interests of MGM's shareholders-that is,
Pathe and Paretti. Pathe contended that since Paretti was a 98%
shareholder, the Bank should have approved the sale, as it would have
operated in Paretti's best interest.
The court rejected Pathe's argument, holding that:
in these circumstances where the company was in bankruptcy until May 28 and even
thereafter the directors labored in the shadow of that prospect, [the Bank's board of
directors] was appropriately mindful of the potential differing interests between the
corporation and its 98% shareholder. At least where a corporation is operating in the
vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk
64
bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.

In the now (in)famous footnote 55, reproduced in full below,
Chancellor Allen elaborated:

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at *11 n.22.
at *11.
at *12.
at *19.
at *21.
at *34.
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The possibility of insolvency can do curious things to incentives, exposing creditors to
risks of opportunistic behavior and creating complexities for directors. Consider, for
example, a solvent corporation having a single asset, a judgment for $51 million against
a solvent debtor. The judgment is on appeal and thus subject to modification or reversal.
Assume that the only liabilities of the company are to bondholders in the amount of $12
million. Assume that the array of probable outcomes of the appeal is as follows:

25% chance of affirmance ($51mm)
70% chance of modification ($4 mm)
5% chance of reversal ($0)

Expected value
$12.75 mm
$2.8 mm
$0

Expected Value of Judgment on Appeal: $15.55 mm
Thus, the best evaluation is that the current value of the equity is $3.55 million. ($15.55
million expected value of the judgment on appeal, minus the $12 million liability to
bondholders). Now assume an offer to settle at $12.5 million (also consider one at 17.5
million). By what standard do the directors of the company evaluate the fairness of
these offers? The creditors of this solvent company would be in favor of accepting either
a $12.5 million offer or a $17.5 million offer. In either event they will avoid the 75% risk
of insolvency and default. The stockholders, however, will plainly be opposed to
acceptance of a $12.5 million settlement (under which they get practically nothing).
More importantly, they very well may be opposed to acceptance of the $17.5 million offer
under which the residual value of the corporation would increase from $3.5 million to
$5.5 million. This is so because the litigation alternative, with its 25% probability of a
$39 million outcome to them ($51 million - $12 million = $39 million) has an expected
value to the residual risk bearer of $9.75 million ($39 million x 25% chance of
affirmance), substantially greater than the $5.5 million available to them in the
settlement. While in fact the stockholders' preference would reflect their appetite for
risk, it is possible (and with diversified shareholders likely) that shareholders would
prefer rejection of both settlement offers.
But if we consider the community of interests that the corporation represents it seems
apparent that one should in this hypothetical accept the best settlement offer available
providing it is greater than $15.55 million, and one below that amount should be
rejected. But that result will not be reached by a director who thinks he owes his duties
directly to shareholders only. It will be reached by directors who are capable of
conceiving of the corporation as a legal and economic entity. Such directors will
recognize that in managing the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of
insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair)
course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or
the creditors, or the employees, or any5 single group interested in the corporation) would
6
make if given the opportunity to act.

Thus, the Bank was not liable for choosing a course of action
arguably not in the best interest of MGM's controlling shareholder,
because it was entitled to consider the interests of other corporate
constituencies. In refusing to sell the movie distribution company, the
board had permissibly benefited MGM's creditors to the detriment of
its 98% shareholder.

65.

Id. at *34 n.55.

1250

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:4:1235

Credit Lyonnais broke new ground. It extended some sort of
insolvency duty beyond insolvency in fact to situations where a
corporation labors in the shadow (or vicinity) of insolvency. However,
the opinion raised new questions: What is the vicinity of insolvency?
What is the proper scope of the duty to creditors in that zone? Can
creditors sue for a direct breach of duty? Can creditors bring a
derivative action? Does this extended duty act in parity with
fraudulent conveyance law? What place does the business judgment
rule hold in the zone of insolvency? As outlined below, courts have
answered these questions in different ways.
B. Post-Credit Lyonnais Jurisprudence
Courts have interpreted the Credit Lyonnais decision in three
related ways. First, some treat Credit Lyonnais as a sword giving
creditors the ability to sue. 66 Second, some find that a breach of duty
will occur only under a narrowly defined set of circumstances, such as
self-dealing, fraudulent conveyance, or improper preference of one
creditor over the others. 67 Third, some hold that Credit Lyonnais acts
only as a shield for directors, who cannot be held liable for considering
the interests of other constituencies in the zone of insolvency. 68 Each
of these interpretations will be discussed in turn.
1. Credit Lyonnais as a Sword for Creditors
Courts that treat Credit Lyonnais as a sword begin with the
proposition that Credit Lyonnais operates in parity with Geyer v.
Ingersoll PublicationsCo.69 In Geyer, the Delaware Court of Chancery
established that a direct trustee-like duty is owed to creditors of a firm
that is insolvent in fact.7 0 The Credit Lyonnais court, so the argument

66.
The breach of th[e] duty [that directors owe to creditors in their capacity as
trustee] gives rise to a claim that can be pursued by the creditors. Delaware
may have expanded this duty, as distinguished from the directors' fiduciary
duty to the corporation, when the corporation operates within a zone of
insolvency.
Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon (In re Zale Corp.), 196 B.R. 348, 354-55 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996)
(citations omitted).
67. Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 655-56
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998).
68. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 788 (Del. Ch. 2004)
69. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992); see, e.g., Jewel Recovery,
196 B.R. at 354-55 (noting that Delaware may have expanded the duty to creditors from
insolvency to near-insolvency).
70. Id. at 787, 790.
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goes, did not change the substance of this duty, it merely expanded its
scope to near-insolvency. 71 Thus, the duty owed in insolvency in fact is
identical to the duty owed in near-insolvency-both are derived from
trust law. According to this approach, when a firm is either insolvent
in fact or near-insolvent, creditors have the right to challenge a
board's decisions as a breach of fiduciary duty. A prime example of
this approach is the case of Weaver v.Kellogg, where a federal district
court denied summary judgment on the grounds that "under both
Delaware law and Texas law, corporate insiders... may have a
fiduciary duty to the corporation's creditors even when the corporation
72
[i]s not insolvent."
Likewise, in In re Zale Corp., a bankruptcy court sitting in
Texas allowed a creditor to sue a near-insolvent corporation for breach
of fiduciary duty. 73 There, the creditor alleged that the corporate
directors had stripped the corporation of its assets during the
effectuation of an LBO and merger. 74 Although the corporation was
not yet insolvent, the court invoked the trust fund doctrine as
justification for the right to sue:
Delaware law recognizes that when a corporation becomes insolvent, the assets of the
corporation become a trust for the benefit of the corporation's creditors. The corporate
directors then hold a fiduciary duty as trustees to protect the assets for the creditors.
The breach of that duty can give rise to a claim that can be pursued by the creditors.
Delaware may have expanded this duty, as distinguishedfrom the directors' fiduciary
duty to the corporation, when the corporation operates within a zone of insolvency.
Delaware does not appear to require that the corporation cease doing business or be
incapable of conducting its business. 75

In other words, a corporation need not be insolvent in fact in
order to trigger a fiduciary duty owed to creditors. Although the Zale
court did not explicitly extend the trust fund rationale to nearinsolvent firms, it left open the possibility that the doctrine applies to
76
firms that are on the outer-edge of insolvency or near-insolvency.
71. Jewel Recovery, 196 B.R. at 355.
72. Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 583-84 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997).
73. Jewel Recovery, 196 B.R. at 354-55.
74. Id. at 354.
75. Id. at 354-55 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
76. Near-insolvency has never been adequately defined. See, e.g., Peoples Dep't Stores, Inc.
(Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 493 (Can.) ("The directors' fiduciary duty does not
change when a corporation is in the nebulous 'vicinity of insolvency.' That phrase has not been
defined; moreover, it is incapable of definition and has no legal meaning. What it is obviously
intended to convey is a deterioration in the corporation's financial stability."). There is no magic
line that can be inserted somewhere between solvency and insolvency denoting the exact point at
which insolvency happens. For example, the same firm may be deemed insolvent according to
one method (such as the balance sheet test) but solvent according to another (such as the
equitable insolvency test). This reflects the inherent unpredictability of associating a shift of
fiduciary duties with the near-insolvency standard.
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A similar result was reached in In re Buckhead America Corp.77
The dispute in Buckhead arose from an LBO of a parent corporation
financed heavily by its wholly owned subsidiary. 78 The financing
79
arrangements allegedly caused the subsidiary to become insolvent.
Buckhead America Corporation ("Buckhead") was a 100% owned
subsidiary of Days Inn of America Corporation ("DIC").8 0 Defendants
owned 49.5% of DIC.8 1 In an attempt to "go private," DIC directed
Buckhead to buy the other 50.5% of DIC stock.8 2 Buckhead financed
this transaction by incurring $175 million in debt.8 3 The stock was
then essentially given away to Reliance Capital Group, L.P. ("RCG"),
8 4
from whom Buckhead received no consideration.
Plaintiffs, creditors of Buckhead (now in a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding), alleged fraudulent conveyance and breach of
fiduciary duty.8 5 Concerning the latter claim, the creditors claimed
that
(1) such actions (the LBOs) were taken for defendants' own benefit and not for the
benefit of [Buckhead], (2) [Buckhead] was rendered insolvent as a result of the two
LBOs at issue, and (3) [Buckhead's] insolvency obligated the directors to 'give their ...
loyalty, and owe a fiduciary duty to, the creditors of the corporation-not its
86
shareholders.

The Buckhead court allowed the breach of fiduciary duty claim
to proceed past a motion to dismiss, rejecting Buckhead's argument
that "to the extent the [Buckhead] directors took actions for the
benefit of [DIC], its sole stockholder ... such conduct is completely
consistent with their duty of loyalty."8 7 The court never determined
whether Buckhead was insolvent or near-insolvent. The complaint
alleged both, but the court's discussion did not distinguish between
the two. Instead, relying on Credit Lyonnais, the court allowed the
breach of fiduciary duty claim to proceed. 88

77. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance Capital
Group, Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 968 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994).
78. Id. at 959-60.
79. Id. at 960.
80. Id. at 959.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 960.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 968.
87. Id.
88. The specific words relied upon by the court were: "'where a corporation is operating in
the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers,
but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise,' including the corporation's creditors." Id. (citation
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A significant difference between In re Zale and In re Buckhead
is the way in which the courts justified the duty to creditors. The Zale
court based its duty on the trust fund doctrine, finding that the duty
originated from the directors' obligations as trustees of the corporate
assets,8 9 whereas the Buckhead court described the duty to creditors
as part of the general duty to the corporate enterprise. 90 In other
words, the Zale and Buckhead courts, relying on identical precedent
cases, came up with different rationales for the same rule. The rule,
however, has different implications based on which rationale is used.
The Zale discussion emphasized the creditor's right to have assets
preserved for his benefit, suggesting that a duty is owed directly to
creditors. The Buckhead discussion suggested that a duty is owed only
indirectly to creditors, as a byproduct of the duty to the entire
corporate enterprise.
The Zale opinion leaves open the possibility that the duties
owed in a near-insolvent firm are the equivalent to those owed in an
insolvent firm. Such a rule fails to distinguish between the two
separate theories that justify a duty to creditors: the trust fund
doctrine and the at-risk theory. Although the trust fund doctrine
applies in insolvency in fact, it loses conceptual force when applied to
firms that are not clearly insolvent. Credit Lyonnais, which seems to
be based on the theory that a board may permissibly incorporate the
interests of creditors-who are increasingly "at risk" in a nearinsolvent firm-into its business judgment, suggests that a more
limited obligation is owed to creditors of near insolvent firms.
2. The Empirical Approach-Credit Lyonnais as a Sword, but Only in
Limited Circumstances
Some courts, wary of the potential uncertainty that an
affirmative duty to creditors would create, have limited the
application of the insolvency duty to specific factual circumstances
where the creditor can show fraud or self-dealing. For example, in Ben
Franklin Retail Stores, the bankruptcy court dismissed a creditor
claim for breach of fiduciary duty because the creditor could not allege
directorial self-dealing. 91 There, the creditors sued the directors and

omitted) (quoting Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comm. Corp., No. 12150, 1991
WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)).
89. Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon (In re Zale Corp.), 196 B.R. 348, 354-55 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1996).
90. In re Buckhead Am. Corp., 178 B.R. at 968.
91. Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 655-56
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998).
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officers of Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc. ("Ben Franklin") and its
subsidiaries for allegedly creating misleading accounting figures in
92
order to induce a loan.
In dismissing the claim, the court first noted the general rule
that in a solvent corporation, "directors do not owe creditors duties
beyond
the
relevant
contractual
terms
absent
'special
circumstances."' 93 It also accepted the premise that in insolvency,
directors owe duties to creditors. 94 However, it questioned the scope of
these insolvency duties. The Ben Franklin directors argued that the
duties merely "require that directors refrain from self dealing or
preferring shareholders or favored creditors over the general creditor
body." 95 Conversely, the creditors contended that "directors of an
insolvent corporation owe duties of care, loyalty and good faith to
creditors similar to those owed to shareholders of solvent
corporations."96
The court sided with the Ben Franklin directors. Beginning
with the language of Credit Lyonnais,97 it framed the opinion as an
attempt to protect all constituencies from the opportunistic behavior of
the others. 98 The court further inferred from Credit Lyonnais that the
duties are owed to the corporation, not directly to creditors,
characterizing that case and Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co. 99 as
92. Specifically, the creditors claimed that the defendants were liable for "wrongfully
prolonging the Debtors' corporate lives beyond the point of insolvency by misrepresenting the
true value of the Debtor's accounts receivable." Id. at 649.
93. Id. at 653.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97.
[I]n managing the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of
insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient and
the fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that
the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group
interested in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity to act.
Id. at 655 (citation omitted) (quoting Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comm.
Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)).
98.
The potential "opportunistic behavior" about which the chancellor expressed
concern, then, was the disposition of property at "fire sale prices" for the sole
benefit of the shareholder, and unreasonable risk-taking, also for the sole
benefit of shareholders, with corporate assets .... The chancellor's solution
was to shield such directors from liability to shareholders by declaring that
their duty is to serve the interests of the corporate enterprise, encompassing
all its constituent groups, without preference to any.
Id.
99. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787-88 (Del. Ch. 1992) (recognizing the
existence of a duty to creditors when a corporation is insolvent in fact).
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cases where "the alleged wrongful act involved the disposition of
assets for the benefit of shareholders, but to the detriment of the
entire corporate enterprise rather than any single group interested in
the corporation at a point in time when the shareholder's wishes
should not be the directors' only concern." 10 0 Hence, where there is no
injury to the aggregate corporate enterprise, there is no breach of
fiduciary duties. Conversely, where directors act for the benefit of the
entire corporate enterprise (framed in terms of wealth-maximization),
then they do not breach their fiduciary duties, even if they act in
detriment to a single, specific constituency, such as creditors.
According to the court, directors who create misleading
accounts receivable figures in order to induce a loan do not breach any
fiduciary duty if their actions benefit the corporation as a whole 101
The creditors' claims were based entirely upon injury to the creditor
constituency, but what mattered was injury to the entire corporate
enterprise. In other words, the creditors could bring a successful
fiduciary duty action only in situations where the creditor class is
injured and the aggregate corporate enterprise is harmed. Such a
situation will exist in limited circumstances, for example, where the
creditors can allege that:
the debtors did not get full value for the debts they incurred, or that they did not use
that value in an effort to restore the corporation to financial health. That is ...that the
Defendants did not use corporate assets in 'an informed, good faith effort to maximize
the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity. 102

Directors, then, only breach their duty in limited situations involving
self-dealing or misappropriation of corporate assets because in such
cases the creditors and the entire corporate enterprise are harmed.103
Comparing Ben Franklin Retail Stores Inc. with In re
Buckhead reveals another nuance in the way courts perceive
insolvency duties. Both courts held that according to Credit Lyonnais,
a duty is owed to the entire corporate enterprise. The Buckhead court
left open the possibility of board liability in situations where a board
acts arguably for the good of the corporate enterprise, but to the
detriment of a single constituency. Conversely, the Ben Franklincourt
requires that the corporate enterprise itself be injured. That is, it

100. In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc., 225 B.R. at 655 (citation omitted) (quoting Geyer,
621 A.2d at 789).
101. Id. at 656.
102. Id.
103. Although directors can also be held liable for breach of the duty of care, corporate
charters often exculpate directors from liability for breach of the duty of care. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007) (authorizing a corporation to exculpate its directors from
liability for breach of the duty of due care, subject to certain exceptions).
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treats the corporation as a "black box"-unless a director uses the
corporation in a way that robs it of its assets, there can be no breach of
a fiduciary duty to creditors.
From an empirical standpoint, the Ben Franklin standard
provides a realistic assessment of how many judges decide insolvency
duty cases. The court's analysis was influenced by the observations of
Professor Laura Lin, who argued that, as of 1993, "[a]ll of the
decisions in which the courts have allowed creditors to recover for
breach of fiduciary duty have involved directors of an insolvent
corporation diverting corporate assets for the benefit of insiders or
preferred creditors." 10 4 Professor Lin's empirical observations,
although over a decade old, still retain force today. For example, in
Bank of America v. Musselman, a federal district court sitting in
Virginia held that a creditor may not sue an officer for breach of
fiduciary duty absent proof of self dealing. 105 In justifying its holding,
the court referred to its empirical analysis that most courts will not
hold management liable absent some sort of self-dealing. 10 6 Similarly,
in four other cases in which there was no showing of self-dealing, the
10 7
courts all refused to find the directors liable.
However, the Ben Franklin interpretation is not without its
problems. It fails to address situations in which a creditor is
significantly harmed, but where that harm is beneficial to the
corporation. Consider a situation where the directors of a nearinsolvent corporation act in a manner that does not lower the value of
the corporation and in fact benefits the corporation, but that hinders
the attempts of an individual creditor to recover.1 08 Is there a breach
of fiduciary duty toward that creditor? 10 9 Under the Ben Franklin
standard, it is not a breach of fiduciary duty, since the duty is owed to
the corporation, not the creditor. In other words, the creditor could not
bring a derivative action. Moreover, it is unclear whether the creditor

104. Lin, supra note 33, 'at 1513 (citation omitted), quoted in In re Ben Franklin Retail
Stores, Inc., 225 B.R. at 655.
105. Bank of Am. v. Musselman, 222 F. Supp. 2d 792, 797 (E.D. Va. 2002).
106. Id. at 799 n.17.
107. Id. at 799-801 (discussing Helm Fin. Corp. v. MNVA R.R., 212 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir.
2000); In re Ben FranklinRetail Stores, Inc., 225 B.R. at 646; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Une,
No. 87 C 10831, 1988 WL 130050 (N.D. Ill. 1988); St. James Capital Corp. v. Pallet Recycling
Assocs. of N. Am., 589 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. App. 1999)).
108. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 797 (Del. Ch. 2004).
109. Vice Chancellor Strine deferred answering his own hypothetical, stating that "there are
a myriad of policy considerations that would arise by the indulgence or non-indulgence of a
fiduciary duty claim of this type and I am reluctant to ponder their viability without better help."
Id.
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could bring a direct fiduciary duty action against the directors. 110
Thus, unless and until it becomes settled law that a creditor can bring
a direct suit for harms resulting from being singled out, the Ben
Franklin standard leaves open the troubling possibility that such
behavior on the part of directors would be permissible.
3. Credit Lyonnais as a Shield for Directors
In Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc.,"'
("Production Resources"), Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware
Chancery Court suggested that Credit Lyonnais should be read to
operate as a shield for directors, rather than as justification for giving
creditors the benefit of an affirmative fiduciary duty in the zone of
insolvency."12 The case arose out of a breach of fiduciary duty claim
brought by creditor Production Resources Group ("PRG") against
debtor NCT Group Inc. ("NCT"). NCT owed PRG a debt of $2,000,000,
but it was on the verge of insolvency and never paid. However, NCT
was able to continue operating due to capital infusions by its
113
controlling shareholder, Carole Salkind ("Salkind").
The facts of the case were particularly egregious. The NCT
board had
(1) not convened an annual stockholder meeting for several years; (2) caused NCT to
pledge billions of shares more than are authorized by its charter; (3) permitted Salkind
to obtain liens on the assets of the corporation; (4) retained no less than 8 companies
affiliated with Salkind under substantial consulting contracts while refusing to cause
the company to pay its debt to PRG; (5) placed funds from Salkind into a subsidiary
company, rather than NCT itself, in order to avoid collection efforts by PRG; and (6)
paid substantial salaries and bonuses
to [two directors] while refusing to cause the
114
company to pay its debt to PRG.

On these findings, the court held that NCT was insolvent in
fact and that PRG, in its capacity as a creditor, could initiate a
derivative action for the harm the board caused to the corporation.

110. Vice Chancellor Strine raises the possibility that a creditor in this situation can directly
sue for breach of fiduciary duty. Under Delaware law, a corporation may favor one creditor over
another, unless the favored creditor is an insider. Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp., 156 A. 180
(Del. Ch. 1931). However, the court assumed, for the purposes of its opinion, that "there might,
possibly exist circumstances in which the directors display such a marked degree of animus
towards a particular creditor with a proven entitlement to payment that they expose themselves
to a direct fiduciary duty claim by that creditor." Prod.Res. Group,, 863 A.2d at 798.
111. Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 772.
112. For an in-depth discussion of Vice Chancellor Strine's opinion, see Huff & Silberglied,
supranote 8.
113. Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 774.
114. Id. at 799-800.
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Although the court allowed PRG to sue, it emphasized that the
injury was to the corporation, not the creditor. 115 Thus, "poor decisions
by directors that lead to a loss of corporate assets and are alleged to be
breaches of equitable fiduciary duties remain harms to the corporate
entity itself."116 PRG's claims were derivative in nature, because they
were derived from harm to the corporation. 1 7 Thus, PRG could sue on
behalf of the corporation to recover the value by which NCT was
diminished, but could not bring a fiduciary duty action on behalf of
itself individually.
While the above analysis was enough to rule on the facts of the
case, the court also discussed, in dicta, the proper interpretation of
Credit Lyonnais as applied to near-insolvent firms."18 The court
disapproved of the idea that Credit Lyonnais created an affirmative
duty to creditors in near-insolvent firms, stating that those courts
were "using the law of fiduciary duty to fill gaps that do not exist." 119
Creditors already possess protections such as "strong covenants, liens
on assets, and other negotiated contractual protections,"'1 20 and they
can rely on the implied covenant of good faith and the law of
fraudulent conveyance. 12' These protections adequately remedy most
of the situations that creditors confront when a corporation does not
122
pay its debts.
Thus, the Production Resources court reaffirmed the notion
that there should be no duty to creditors in near-insolvency, but that
there instead remains a constant duty to the corporation, with an
accompanying shift in the balance of interests of the affected
constituencies. As Chancellor Allen stated in Credit Lyonnais, the

115. Id. at 792. ("[Tlhe transformation of a creditor into a residual owner does not change the
nature of the harm in a typical claim for breach of fiduciary duty by corporate directors.").
116. Id.
117. According to the court, "the reason for this bears repeating - the fact of insolvency does
not change the primary object of the director's duties, which is the firm itself. The firm's
insolvency simply makes the creditors the principal constituency injured by any fiduciary
breaches that diminish the firm's value." Id.
118. The court characterized near-insolvent firms as firms within the "zone of insolvency."
Id. at 790.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. ("[W]ith these protections, when creditors are unable to prove that a corporation or
its directors breached any of the specific legal duties owed to them, one would think that the
conceptual room for concluding that the creditors were somehow, nevertheless, injured by
inequitable conduct would be extremely small, if extant.").
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duty is owed to the "corporate enterprise ... [and] to the community of
' 123
interest that sustained the corporation."
Since the duty is owed to the corporate entity, directors of nearinsolvent firms receive the procedural and substantive protections of
the business judgment rule. 124 According to the Production Resources
court,
the Credit Lyonnais decision's holding and spirit clearly emphasized that directors
would be protected by the business judgment rule if they, in good faith, pursued a less
risky business strategy precisely because they feared a more risky strategy might
render the firm unable to meet its legal obligations to creditors and other
constituencies. 125

On the particular facts of Credit Lyonnais, the directors were
given a shield to defend from stockholder suits for making decisions
based on stakeholder interests. A logical extension of Credit Lyonnais,
then, is the reverse: directors of near-insolvent firms can be shielded
from stakeholder claims alleging that directors are not adequately
considering stakeholder interests. In both cases, the alleged harm is
not only to the affected constituency, but also to the corporation, as
"poor decisions by directors that lead to a loss of corporate assets...
remain harms to the corporate entity itself."126 A board's duties, then,
do not undergo profound changes as the corporation nears
insolvency-the duty runs to the benefit of the corporation, as always.
Consequently, just like when making any other regular business
decision, the business judgment rule should remain applicable and
operate to protect directors who make reasonably informed decisions
127
in good faith.

123. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comm. Corp., No. 12150,1991 WL
277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
124. Courts have come to different conclusions on whether the business judgment rule
applies to decisions made during insolvency. For an example of a court declining to apply the
business judgment rule, see Mims v. Kennedy Capital Mgmt., Inc. (In re Performance Nutrition,
Inc.), 239 B.R. 93, 111 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999) ("[Tlhe business judgment rule may be wholly
inapplicable in a case where the corporation is insolvent."); see also Unsecured Creditors Comm.
v. Gen. Homes Corp. (In re Gen. Homes Corp.), 199 B.R. 148, 151-52 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996)
("[M]oreover, while the business judgment rule may apply to the decisions of solvent
corporations, it has no consequence in the context of a conservatorship."). For an example of a
court applying the business judgment rule, but ruling in favor of creditors, see Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors of Toy King Distribs., Inc. v. Liberty Sav. Bank (In re Toy King Distribs.,
Inc.), 256 B.R. 1 (Bankr. M.D. Fl. 2000). For an example of a court applying the business
judgment rule and holding in favor of the debtor corporation, see Odyssey Partners, L.P. v.
Fleming Co., 735 A.2d 386 (Del. Ch. 1999).
125. Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 788.
126. Id. at 792.
127. Id. ("[T]he business judgment rule remains important and provides directors with the
ability to make a range of good faith, prudent judgments about the risks they should undertake
on behalf of troubled firms.").
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THE SOLUTION: APPLYING THE DISCRETIONARY APPROACH TO

NEAR-INSOLVENCY
Much of the confusion in near-insolvency law stems from the
fact that courts have not distinguished between the two separate
rationales for extending a duty to creditors. The first rationale, the
trust fund doctrine, treats directors of an insolvent firm as trustees
and creditors as beneficiaries. The second rationale, the "at risk"
doctrine, 128 recognizes that as the corporation nears insolvency, the
shareholders will favor riskier strategies since they bear minimum
downside and unlimited upside potential. This risk of shareholder
opportunism falls on the creditors, who must rely on the remaining
corporate assets to satisfy their contractual claims.
The duties created by the two rationales are not identical. The
trust fund doctrine turns the creditor into the beneficiary of a
fiduciary duty, while the "at risk" doctrine favors a discretionary duty,
or at best an indirect duty that is derivative of the general duty to the
corporation. The trust fund doctrine is well established as the primary
rationale for the duty to creditors in insolvency in fact. However, the
Credit Lyonnais opinion, which arguably extended duties into the
near-insolvency context, did not base its reasoning on the trust fund
doctrine. Instead, the court seems to have adopted "at risk" approach.
129
Despite Chancellor Allen's long footnote explaining his reasons,
some courts have failed to distinguish between the two rationales and
have extended a duty to creditors in near-insolvent firms based on the
trust fund doctrine.
Because of the differences in the underlying rationales,
however, the two doctrines are not synonymous and must be
distinguished. Creditors are not true principals and so, when a
corporation is not insolvent in fact, treating creditors as the
beneficiaries of an affirmative fiduciary duty would make no sense.
However, blind adherence to shareholder primacy ignores the greater
risk of shareholder opportunism and is thus an equally poor solution.
As discussed below, a discretionary approach, derivative of the general
duty to the corporation, would be the most consistently applied
standard in a near-insolvent firm.

128. Huff & Silberglied, supra note 8, at *10.
129. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comm. Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
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A. Outside of Insolvency In Fact, CreditorsAre Not True Principals
The corporate form is afflicted by the classic agency problem.
Shareholders invest money in the firm, becoming its theoretical
owners, but they have no say in how the firm is run. Instead, directors
are charged with managing the business and affairs of the
corporation. 130 In an effort to combat the incentive to steal or work less
diligently than if one's own money were at risk, corporate common law
imposes a duty on directors to act with loyalty and prudence. Thus,
rather than impose a scheme whereby every shareholder must
contract with the corporation to ensure its rights, the law creates
broad duties requiring directors to act in a proper manner. 131 The
director, also known as the fiduciary, owes his duties to the
corporation and its shareholders, the principals. To some extent then,
whether creditors should be the subject of a duty in near-insolvency
depends on whether they fall into the traditional mold of "principal,"
as that term is used in the fiduciary-principal relationship. Under the
trust fund doctrine, creditors of firms that are insolvent in fact are
deemed principals, since the directors become trustees of the
remaining corporate assets. However, in near-insolvency, directors
have not yet been converted into trustees. Absent that transformation,
there is no basis for treating creditors as principals.
A fiduciary duty arises from a fiduciary relationship, which in
turn requires a heightened degree of trust. A fiduciary's duties "go
beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to act to further
the beneficiary's best interests."1 3 2 Typical relationships that require
such a high degree of trust and reliance include attorney-client,
trustee-beneficiary, executor-heir, and doctor-patient. Conversely, a
debtor-creditor relationship is adversarial in nature. A debtor merely
owes the creditor an obligation to repay a debt. Beyond this
contractual obligation, nothing more is owed. A debtor may owe a
creditor a duty to act in good faith, but the debtor need not act in
furtherance of the creditor's interests. 33 Absent the triggering of the
130. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2007).
131. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361-62 (Del. 1993) (duty of
loyalty); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984) (duty of care and the business
judgment rule); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984) (duty of loyalty).
132. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor:An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 879, 882.
133. For a discussion of how the shift of fiduciary duty to creditor is not supported by two
leading classical theories of fiduciary duty, contractarian and fiduciarian, see J. William
Callison, Why a FiduciaryDuty Shift to Creditorsof Insolvent Business Entities is Incorrect as a
Matter of Theory and Practice, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/conferences/Twilight/CALLISON.PDF.
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trust fund doctrine, this obligation does not rise beyond the level of
"mere fairness and honesty" that is indicative of a contractual
relationship.
B. DirectorsShould Not Be Compelled to Consider Only Shareholder
Interests in Near-Insolvency
The most common explanation as to why a creditor should not
be the beneficiary of a fiduciary duty is that the creditor can contract
to protect himself accordingly. For example, if a creditor believes that
there is a risk that the corporation may default, then he can deny
credit, raise the interest rate to reflect the increased risk, or demand
some form of security. 134 However, not every creditor can rely on these
contractual protections.
Ultimately, the question must be asked: Who is the creditor?
The notion that all creditors can rely on contractual protections
assumes that creditors are large sophisticated entities who voluntarily
take on the role of creditor, such as banks. But what about individuals
whose only claim against the corporation is a court-awarded damages
judgment? Can an involuntary one-time creditor be placed on the
same terms as professional creditors? As one commentator put it,
creditors are viewed as freely bargaining their contracts and thus assuming the risk of
insolvency; hence directors should owe no duty to consider the interests of creditors. Yet
the number and range of creditors of corporations varies. It is true that senior secured
lenders are frequently in a position to bargain a premium in their debt arrangements
that accounts for the risk of financial distress... yet even where such creditors have the
bargaining power to impose self-help remedies when the corporation breaches the
contract or to temper the risk of harm from firm failure, such creditors may not be able
to bargain protection for directorial self-dealing, shirking, or conduct that is in breach of
the director's duties to the corporation ....
In contrast to the secured and senior
creditors, there are thousands of creditors who have neither the bargaining power nor
the information or resources to negotiate protections against risk of firm failure. Thus,
while they become residual claimants, they have not been able to bargain any risk
premium.135

The argument that creditors can contract for their own
protections thus assumes that (1) the debtor-creditor relationship is
voluntary; (2) the creditor has the necessary bargaining power to
secure adequate protections; and (3) that creditors are able to bargain
for protection from self-dealing in the first place.
The
first
assumption
ignores
involuntary
creditors.
Corporations are often the target of litigation. Any judgment against
134. Id. (listing common arguments against the shift of fiduciary duties to creditors in the
vicinity of insolvency).
135. Janis Sarra, Wise People, FiduciaryObligation and Reviewable Transactions, Director's
Liability to Creditors, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW (Janis Sara ed., 2004).
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the corporation creates an involuntary creditor who has not had the
opportunity to bargain for any protections. Likewise, the second
assumption, that creditors have the requisite amount of bargaining
power, is also untrue in some situations. Many trade creditors, for
example, "are small suppliers, and are dependent on the debtor
corporation for a sizeable portion of their orders." 136 In a competitive
market, a trade creditor may feel compelled to forego bargained-for
protections. At the very least, a trade creditor dependent upon the
137
debtor will not be able to diversify its risks.
The third assumption, that creditors will be able to bargain for
protection from self-dealing, is the most speculative. Perhaps some
creditors possess sufficient information on management integrity to
demand a premium for a risk of breach of duty. However, expecting
the majority of creditors to bargain for such a premium is unrealistic.
A creditor should be able to rely on the assumption that a director or
majority shareholder will act in good faith and in compliance with his
duties to the corporation. It is unclear what information would even
suffice to raise the possibility that a firm's directors and managers are
at risk of engaging in self-dealing. Self-dealing is hard to predict, so
unless all creditors always bargain for additional self-dealing
protection (thus universally raising the cost of capital), then some
138
form of added protection should be granted to creditors.
C. A DiscretionaryApproach, Derivative of the General Duty to the
Corporation,Is the Most Workable Standardfor Near-Insolvent Firms
Contractual provisions may adequately protect most creditors,
but they will fail to protect some, especially in a near-insolvent firm
where the creditor bears an increased risk of being subjected to
shareholder opportunism. The Credit Lyonnais court recognized this
inadequacy, and sought to redress it by holding that directors of a
near-insolvent firm may permissibly incorporate creditor interests
into their business judgment, as when, for example, a board decides to
pursue a less risky course of action more favorable to creditors.
However, as discussed above, courts have interpreted Credit Lyonnais
in different ways. 1 39 Some recognize a constant duty to the

136. Id. at 75.
137. Id.
138. Some commentators have argued that insolvency duties should be owed only to certain
types creditors, such as unsecured creditors or tort-claimants. See e.g., J.C. Lipson, Director's
Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 1189 (2003).

139. See supra Part III.B.
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corporation, from which creditors can bring derivative claims for
breach of insolvency duties. 140 Others grant an affirmative duty to
creditors without carefully confining the duty to clear insolvency. 14 As
discussed below, the latter courts go too far and create a standard that
is unacceptably difficult to apply. A discretionary approach avoids the
troubling issue of determining when near-insolvency duties are
triggered. Further, it is better applied in practice and is consistent
with other aspects of state corporate law.
1. The Discretionary Approach Avoids the Problem of Defining Exactly
When Insolvency Duties Are Triggered
If creditors are to be treated as beneficiaries of a fiduciary duty,
then there is the problematic issue of determining when the duty is
triggered. A duty triggered by insolvency in fact or near-insolvency
would require a gauging of the financial health of the corporation on a
continuous basis, so that directors would know with some degree of
certainty when their duties are activated. If the duties are to begin
upon the filing of a formal bankruptcy petition, then directors will
know (and have some control over) exactly when their duties shift.
However, the duty arises upon insolvency in fact, not upon the filing of
a bankruptcy petition.142
Determining when a corporation is insolvent in fact is no easy
task. According to one commentator, "accounting information is being
called on to draw a definite line on which liability hangs yet which in
many ways does not yield certain results.1' 43 Accounting details are
fraught with judgment calls about how a particular account should be
valued. Theoretically, if two separate and independent accountants
audit two identical near-insolvent companies, one might find that the
company is solvent, and the other might conclude that it is insolvent.
The equitable insolvency test, which focuses on whether a firm
can pay its debts as they come due, provides some measure of accuracy
to the analysis. Using the test, it could be possible to determine if a
firm is solvent on any given day. However, the knowledge that on
Monday a corporation is solvent, while on Tuesday it is insolvent, only
to be solvent again on Wednesday, is not helpful. As one Australian

140. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance Capital
Group Inc. (In re Buckhead America Corp.), 178 B.R. 956 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994); Prod. Res.
Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
141. Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon (In re Zale Corp.), 196 B.R. 348 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996).
142. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).
143. David Wishart, Models and Theories of Directors'Duties to Creditors, 14 NEW ZEALAND
U. L. REV., 323, 344 (1991).
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commentator put it, "a company may move in and out of insolvency as
its fortunes fluctuate ...

the duties of directors should be evaluated

from a broad perspective and not on the basis of technicalities. 1 4 4
The issue becomes more complicated now that Delaware and
other jurisdictions arguably recognize that some sort of obligation is
owed in near-insolvency. Many corporations consistently operate in
near-insolvency, such that, under some interpretations, directors in
these corporations would often owe their duties to creditors as well as
to shareholders. 145 Furthermore, it is difficult to determine precisely
the bounds of near-insolvency. Since near-insolvency has never been
adequately defined, it is a shapeless concept.
In an attempt to define near-insolvency, a few courts in other
common law jurisdictions have suggested that duties should shift to
creditors when there is a "risk of insolvency."'' 46 Under this approach,
insolvency duties arise when "a contemplated course of payment or
other course of action would jeopardize solvency."1 47 Thus, insolvency
duties could arise when a company is solvent, but is considering a
risky course of action that could result in insolvency. 148 Aside from the
broadness of this rule, one must question how it would apply in
practice. What level of scienter is required on the part of directors?
Knowledge that their decision might lead to insolvency? A more
realistic standard would be the gross negligence standard. However,
this standard requires courts to ask whether a board of directors is
liable to creditors because things did not turn out well in cases where
a board of a solvent corporation makes a good faith decision to
undertake a high-risk course of action in order to maximize firm
value.
Recognizing a discretionary duty avoids the "triggering"
inquiry altogether. Directors consistently owe a duty to the
corporation. As part of this duty, they would consistently owe an
indirect duty to creditors because creditors are part of the corporate
enterprise. The discussion in most boardrooms would not be focused
upon whether the duty to creditors has been triggered, but instead
upon how much weight, if any, should be assigned to the creditors'
144. Andrew Keay, The Director's Duty to Take into Account the Interests of Company
Creditors: When is it Triggered?, 2001 MELBOURNE U. L. REV., 1, 10-11.
145. Id.

146. Kinsella v. Russell Kinsella Pty. Ltd. (in liq), (1986) 4 N.S.W.L.R. 722, 733 (Austl.).
Kinsella has recently been criticized and de facto rejected by the High Court of Australia in Spies
v. The Queen, (2000) 201 C.L.R. 603 (Austl.) (holding that directors of a near-insolvent company
do not owe creditors an independent fiduciary duty).
147. Nicholson v. Permakraft Ltd., [19851 1 N.Z.L.R. 242 (N.Z.C.A.).
148. See Keay, supra note 144 (arguing that the insolvency duties should be triggered when
there is a risk of insolvency).
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interests. Ultimately, the board should be confident that a good faith
and well-thought out decision will be upheld by the courts.
Indeed, this seems to be the direction that other leading
common law jurisdictions are heading. Most are hostile to the idea of
an affirmative duty to creditors. 149 However, like in the United States,
the law in other commonwealth countries has developed out of
contradictory and confusing precedents. Many older cases in these
jurisdictions suggested that there might be some sort of direct duty,
although none held so definitively. 150 The first case to consider the
issue was Walker v. Wimborne, in which the Australian High Court
held that, although directors owe a general duty to the corporation,
this duty encompasses both shareholder and creditor interests when
the firm is in financial distress.1 51 Similarly, in Kinsella v. Russell
Kinsella Pty. Ltd., the court found that:
where a company is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude ... once it is
accepted, as in my view it must be, that the director's duty to a company as a whole
extends in an insolvency context to not prejudicing the interests of creditors,... [then]
the shareholders do not have the power or authority to absolve the directors from that
breach.152

In 2002, the High Court of Australia rejected these older cases,
instead suggesting that directors need only incorporate creditor
interests into their business judgment to the extent that it benefits the
53
corporation.
Likewise, in 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a
duty of care is owed to all corporate constituents, including
creditors. 154 Conversely, the duty of loyalty is owed to the corporation
alone. Thus, a director who makes a good faith and honest decision
when the firm is near-insolvent is protected from liability. According
to the Court,
perfection is not demanded ... courts are ill-suited and should be reluctant to second
guess the application of business expertise to the considerations that are involved in
corporate decision making, but they are capable, on the facts of any case, of determining

149. See, e.g., Spies, 201 C.L.R. at 603 (holding that directors of a near-insolvent company do
not owe creditors an independent fiduciary duty); Peoples Dep't Stores, Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.) (finding no direct duty to creditors, although a duty of care is owed to
all).
150. See Winkworth v. Edward Baron Dev. Co., (1987) B.C.L.C. 193, 197-98 (K.B.) (language
suggesting a direct duty); Nicholson, 1 N.Z.L.R. at 242 (same); Jeffree v. Nat'l Cos. and Sec.
Comm'n, (1989) 15 A.C.L.R. 217, 221 (K.B.) (same).
151. Walker v. Wimborne, (1976) 50 A.L.J.R. 446 (Austl.); see also David Thomson, Directors,
Creditors, and Insolvency: A Fiduciary Duty or a Duty not to Oppress? 58 U. TORONTO. FAC. L.
REv. 31, 38 (2000) (discussing the leading cases in common law jurisdictions).
152. Kinsella v. Russell Kinsella Pty. Ltd. (in liq), (1986) 4 N.S.W.L.R. 722, 730, 731 (Austl.).
153. Spies, 201 C.L.R. at 603.
154. Peoples Dep't Stores, 3 SC.R. at 461.
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whether an appropriate degree of prudence and diligence 15was
brought to bear in
5
reaching what is claimed to be a reasonable business decision.

The Court was explicit in conveying the point that there is no
shift of duties upon the nearing of insolvency:
The director's fiduciary duty does not change when a corporation is in the nebulous
"vicinity of insolvency." That phrase has not been defined; moreover, it is incapable of
definition and has no legal meaning. What it is obviously intended to convey is a
deterioration in the corporation's financial stability. In assessing the actions of directors
it is evident that any honest and good faith attempt to redress the corporation's
financial problems will, if successful,
both retain value for the shareholders and improve
156
the position of creditors.

Thus, an affirmative duty approach has been rejected by the
highest courts of two other commonwealth jurisdictions. Although
some older cases, like a few of the United States cases discussed
above, suggest a duty to creditors in near-insolvency, the newer high
court decisions support the argument that a duty to creditors in nearinsolvency is a problematic standard.
2. The Discretionary Approach is Better Applied in Practice
The discretionary approach avoids a number of practical
inadequacies of the affirmative duty approach. An affirmative duty in
near-insolvency, by definition, allows a creditor to sue the board for
breach of fiduciary duty before the firm is actually insolvent.
Conceivably, then, directors could face two separate derivative suits at
the same time: one brought by shareholders and one brought by
15 7
creditors.
Worse still, if the affirmative duty takes the form of a direct
duty, such that individual creditors can sue on their own behalf, then
the rule would "invite a multiplicity of actions, encourage litigation
and [waste] considerable time and expense, all of which would be
lessened if the company were the only possible litigant."'158 Further, a
direct duty creates the potential for double recovery, thus violating
"that important principle of insolvency law, the pari passu principle,
[which operates] by preventing any one creditor from stealing a march

155. Id. at 493.
156. Id. at 483
157. See, e.g., Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790 n.56 (Del. Ch.
2004).
158. Donna W. McKenzie Skene, The Director's Duty to the Creditors of a Financially
Distressed Company: A Perspective from Across the Pond, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2007)
(manuscript at 4), availableat http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/blc_2005/4/.

1268

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:4:1235

on other creditors." 159 In short, a direct duty would create a race to the
courthouse.
Moreover, a shift of duties to creditors upon insolvency could
"chill entrepreneurial skills and encourage directors to adopt defensive
strategies instead of maximizing opportunities and profits for the
shareholder's benefit." 160 A board of directors should be free to make
good faith plans to maximize the value of a near-insolvent firm.
Exposing them to potential lawsuits from disgruntled creditors
concerned about the riskiness of the plans would encourage the
1 61
abandonment of potentially profitable plans.
3. The Discretionary Approach Is Consistent with Other Aspects of
Corporate Law
Over the past fifty years, Delaware corporate law has
articulated the notion that, absent special circumstances, directors
owe a duty to the corporation itself.1 62 The contrary view was that
corporations existed for the sole purpose of maximizing shareholder
wealth.1 63 The classic case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. represents an

159. Id. Pari Passu is defined as "proportionally; at an equal pace; without preference."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). It prevents creditors from racing to the courthouse,
since the order in which claims are brought will not affect their distribution in bankruptcy.
160. Jacob S. Ziegel, Corporate Governance and Directors' Duties to Creditors: Two
ContrastingPhilosophies,ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 135, at 133, 157.
161. See Prod.Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 790.
I doubt the wisdom of a judicial endeavor to second-guess good-faith director
conduct in the so-called zone [of insolvency]. Although it is easy to posit
extreme hypotheticals involving directors putting cash in slot machines, the
real world is more likely to generate situations when directors face a difficult
choice between pursuit of a plausible, but risky, business strategy that might
increase the firm's value to the level that equity holders will receive value,
and another course guaranteeing no return for equity but preservation of
value for creditors. Absent self-dealing or other evidence of bad faith, by what
measure is a court fairly to critique the choice made through an award of
damages?
Id.
162. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders
in Change of Control Transactions:Is There Any "There" There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2002)
(describing how Delaware law leans toward the "social entity" school of thought, except in
circumstances where Revlon duties are triggered). The entity school holds that "the corporate
board of directors owes its duties to the corporation itself, rather than to the stockholders." Id. at
1171. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO
L. REV. 261, 264 (1992) (describing the "social entity" theory of the corporation, which emerged
over the last century).
163. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for CorporateLaw, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 440-41 (2001) (describing the shareholder primacy model); see also Strine, supra
note 162, at 1170-71 (describing the "property" school of thought).
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extreme of this shareholder primacy model.1 64 There, the Michigan
Supreme Court forced Ford Motor Company to declare a dividend
after the Company declined to do so on the grounds that it had made
too much money and was better off sharing the gains with the public
by cutting prices. 165 A review of the case law since then, however,
suggests that Dodge v. Ford was an outlier case. More recent court
decisions have granted directors greater discretion in considering the
interests of non-shareholders when making operational business
decisions. 166 Delaware directors may now consider the interests of
other constituencies, provided that those interests "bear some
interests."1 67
relationship to general shareholder
reasonable
Generally, this has allowed boards to look past the short term
interests of shareholders and incorporate the interest of other
stakeholders by justifying a decision on the grounds that it promotes
68
an even greater (although less certain) long-term value.'
In other words, the long-term interests of the corporation can
encompass the interests of its stakeholders. If a board can tie
stakeholder interests to the long-term value of the corporation and its
shareholders, then it may permissibly consider those interests. This
opens up the possibility that corporations are societal institutions with
greater responsibilities than merely ensuring a maximum return for
shareholders. As Chancellor Allen put it,
corporate purpose can be seen as including the advancement of the general welfare. The
board of directors' duties extend beyond assuring investors a fair return, to include a
duty of loyalty, in some sense, to all those interested in or affected by the corporation.
This view could be labeled in a variety of ways: the managerialist conception, the
institutionalist conception, or the social entity conception. All would be descriptive, since

164. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
165. Id. at 507 ("[Ilt is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and
conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the
primary purpose of benefiting others.").
166. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1989)
(holding that a board of a target company may consider the impact of the bid on other
constituencies, "provided that it bears some reasonable relationship to general shareholder
interests"); Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986)
(narrowing the Unocal holding by requiring that any consideration of non-shareholder interests
be rationally related to a benefit accruing to the shareholders); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (holding that a board of directors may take into account the impact
on constituencies other than shareholders when it decides whether to adopt a takeover defense).
167. Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1282 n.29. An exception arises when Revlon duties
are activated, in which case directors must maximize shareholder value without regard to other
stakeholder interests.
168. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 570 A.2d 1136, 1140 (Del. 1990)
(holding that Time and Warner may merge, even though a Time-Paramount merger would offer
the shareholders a greater premium because, among other things, the Time directors made good
faith and reasonable findings that Time's long-term value would be greater served by a merger
with Warner).
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the corporation is seen as distinct from each of the individuals that happens to fill the
social roles that its internal rules and culture define.
The corporation itself is, in this
169
view, capable of bearing legal and moral obligations.

The above-mentioned Delaware approach is representative of the
170
corporate common law in other jurisdictions.
Basing the near-insolvent corporate board's obligation to
creditors on the discretionary approach is consistent with how
stakeholder interests are treated under current law. The discretionary
approach creates an "obligation" that is derivative of the general duty
to the corporation. In other words, it allows directors to consider
creditor interests, but only to the extent that doing so benefits the
corporation. Like current law, directors would be given a shield, in the
form of greater discretion, with which to defend themselves from
shareholder suits. Creditors, however, would not be given a sword for
the attack.
By way of contrast, an affirmative-duty approach would not
structurally mesh with a board's other duties. If a director owed a
fiduciary duty to creditors, how would the board reconcile its new
obligations with the existing duties it already owes to the
shareholders? The director would owe an identical duty to two
constituencies whose interests are often adversarial. In addition,
many creditors can rely on other bodies of law for protection, such as
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent
conveyance law, and contract law. As one court put it, allowing
creditors to challenge director decisions as a breach of fiduciary duty
"arguably... involves using the law of fiduciary duty to fill gaps that
171
do not exist."
Doing away with the notion that there is a duty to creditors
outside of insolvency brings back a measure of stability to the law of
fiduciary duty. 172 Corporate common law should aim to create clear
and precise standards that directors can rely on when making
business decisions. The discretionary approach protects directors from
lawsuits filed by discontented creditors and at the same time permits
directors to integrate creditor interests into their business decisions.
169. Allen, supra note 162, at 265.
170. ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituency Statutes: Potential for
Confusion, 45 BUS. L. 2253, 2261 (1990) ("We believe the Delaware courts have stated the
prevailing corporate common law in this country: directors have fiduciary responsibilities to
shareholders which, while allowing directors to give consideration to the interests of others,
compel them to find some reasonable relationship to the long-term interests of shareholders
when so doing.").
171. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 789-90 (Del. Ch. 2004).
172. Callison, supra note 133 (arguing that there should be no duty to creditors because
creating a duty would impose unacceptable ambiguity upon directors).
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Overall, a well-functioning corporation requires directors who will
make decisions for the good of the entire corporation, including its
stakeholders.
V. CONCLUSION

Ever since the 1991 Credit Lyonnais decision, courts and
commentators have disagreed about the scope of what obligations, if
any, are owed to creditors of a near-insolvent firm. Before Credit
Lyonnais, many courts recognized that fiduciary duties were owed in
firms that were insolvent in fact. These duties arose out of the trustfund doctrine, which treated creditors as the beneficiaries of a
corporate trust composed of the firm's remaining corporate assets.
Directors, as trustees, owed a fiduciary duty parallel to any other
trustee-beneficiary relationship. A second doctrine, labeled by some
commentators as the "at risk" doctrine, 173 imposed a fiduciary duty to
protect creditors based on their role as the primary down-side risk
bearers in an insolvent firm. The "at risk" doctrine does not
necessarily favor the creation of a duty to creditors in near-insolvency.
The Credit Lyonnais Court sparked controversy when it
recognized that directors could consider creditor interests in "the
vicinity of insolvency."'174 Many courts have read Credit Lyonnais to
stand for the proposition that an affirmative duty extends to creditors
in a near-insolvent firm. However, the trust fund doctrine loses its
force when applied outside of insolvency, since the duty it creates
arises from the trustee-beneficiary relationship created in an insolvent
firm. Further, the idea of a duty to creditors seems to create an
unworkable standard that is inconsistent with how current law treats
other stakeholders.
Yet the idea that creditor interests should never receive extra
regard in a near-insolvent firm is equally unsatisfactory. Although
many creditors can rely on express and implied contractual
protections, some, such as judgment-creditors, have no contract.
Additionally, given the chances that a near-insolvent firm may soon
become insolvent, directors should not be penalized for incorporating
creditor interests into their business decisions, as long as those
decisions are made in good faith.
The discretionary approach offers directors the protection they
deserve for guiding a financially distressed firm. It authorizes

173. Huff & Silberglied, supra note 8.
174. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comm. Corp., No. 12150,1991 WL
277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
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directors of near-insolvent firms to act with regard to creditor
interests, but does not force them to do so. The directors are protected
from shareholder lawsuits claiming that the corporation should adopt
riskier strategies. However, creditors cannot sue unless they seek to
remedy an injury to the corporate enterprise. Since the duty is more of
a shield than a sword, there is no "triggering point," as there would be
if a duty were owed directly to creditors.
Most importantly, the discretionary approach is the most easily
applied standard. It is also consistent with how corporate common law
treats other stakeholders. Directors crave stability and predictability
in the law. A standard based on the general duty to the corporate
enterprise is familiar to directors seeking to comply with their duties.
A board would no longer face the untenable situation of being sued by
their shareholders or, if not, by their creditors. The discretionary
approach is first and foremost a defensive approach, such that
"directors who make good faith, careful judgments in the honest belief
that they are acting in the best interests of the corporation should not
fear liability."175 Since this approach is the same regardless of whether
the firm is solvent or near-insolvent, there is no point in retaining that
distinction any longer.
Cory Dean Kandestin*

175. E. Norman Veasey, What Happened In Delaware Corporate Law And Governance From
1992-2004, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1430 (2005).
Thanks to Professor Margaret Blair for her insightful comments and suggestions on an
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